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INTRODUCTION 
n 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, one aspect of which was what President 
Obama called the “Volcker Rule.”  The Volcker Rule was intended to 
minimize systemic risk in the financial system by limiting the 
authority of insured depository institutions to manage hedge funds 
and to engage in proprietary trading.  The legislative process, 
however, weakened the Volcker Rule.  The final version of the rule 
contains several loopholes and the Act leaves many significant details 
for a patchwork of regulatory agencies to resolve. 
This Comment will focus on the Merkley-Levin Amendment to the 
Act that would have codified the Volcker Rule.  The amendment was 
one of the most controversial aspects of the Act.  Focusing on this 
amendment provides a window into understanding what happened in 
Congress and why, and how the amendment invested regulatory 
agencies with immense rulemaking authority. 
First, this Comment describes the Volcker Rule and explains why 
the rule is needed.  It walks through the amendment as introduced.  
Second, the Comment describes the political pressures that influenced 
the final form of the Act.  Third, it walks through the loophole-filled 
version of the amendment that Congress enacted.  Fourth, it discusses 
the rulemaking process in terms of public choice theory and attempts 
to convey the immense burden that the Act placed on agencies.  
Finally, it suggests possible agency solutions to close some of the 
loopholes in the Volker Rule, focusing in particular on hedge fund 
regulations. 
 
I
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I 
THE VOLCKER RULE AND THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
A.  The Volcker Rule 
In 2009, the Group of Thirty, an international group of financial 
experts, placed blame for what was already the worst financial crisis 
in more than sixty years on proprietary trading and conflicts of 
interest in the financial system.1  Paul Volcker, who was the Federal 
Reserve System Chairman under Presidents Carter and Reagan, and is 
the current chair of President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board, chairs the Group of Thirty.2  The Group found that large losses 
in proprietary trading, bank sponsorship of hedge funds, and exposure 
to structured credit products had placed the viability of the entire 
financial system at risk.3  The Group concluded that the complexities 
of the proprietary capital market and the perceived need for 
confidentiality limit the transparency of the system, increase risks to 
creditors and investors, and make regulation of the system difficult.4  
Moreover, there is an air of unfair competition because some firms 
that are supervised by the government are permitted to engage in 
risky banking transactions.5  But, after implementation of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), those firms are essentially 
insulated from the full force of possible failure.6 
To taper the risks that proprietary trading and bank-managed hedge 
funds pose to the financial system, the Group of Thirty recommended 
that “systemically important banking institutions should be restricted” 
from engaging in risky trading activities and activities that pose 
conflicts of interest.7  Their recommendations essentially embraced 
the spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act by urging placement of limitations 
on the ability of financial institutions to engage in high-risk 
 
1 156 CONG. REC. S5894 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley). 
2 See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Names Volcker to Head New Economic Panel, CAUCUS (Nov. 
26, 2008, 9:54 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/obama-plans-to         
-name-volcker-as-head-of-new-economic-panel. 
3 GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
27 (2009), http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for 
_Financial_Stability.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. at 24–25, 27. 
7 Id. at 28. 
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speculative investments.8  The Group also recommended that steps be 
taken to eliminate conflicts of interest between the bank’s own 
investments and the investments of its clients.9  Specifically, the 
Group suggested that banking institutions should be prohibited from 
comingling their own funds in hedge funds in which their clients are 
also invested.10  Furthermore, the Group suggested that proprietary 
trading should be subject to strict liquidity and capital requirements.11 
Chairman Volcker later testified before the Senate Banking 
Committee that he hoped, through these reforms, to end “too big to 
fail” and the era of government bailouts, and to change the 
expectations of banking institutions to reduce moral hazard.12  He 
hoped that with the adoption of the proposed procedural safeguards, 
the government would step in when a bank failed—not to bail out the 
institution, but to facilitate an orderly liquidation of its assets.13  
Chairman Volcker advocated that banks should expect “euthanasia, 
not a rescue.”14 
In January 2010, President Obama announced a need for banks to 
adhere to their central purpose—serving their customers.15  To do so, 
the President favored “common-sense” restrictions on proprietary 
trading and restrictions on hedge fund investing to reduce conflicts of 
interest.16  He called the proposal the “Volcker Rule.”  The President 
outlined the Volcker Rule in no uncertain terms: “Banks will no 
longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor hedge funds, private 
 
8 See 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2006) (identifying the spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 to 
be that “it shall be unlawful . . . [f]or any person, firm, corporation, association, [or] 
business trust . . . engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing  
. . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any 
extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment 
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit . . . or upon request of the 
depositor”). 
9 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 3, at 28. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5–8, 
49–51 (Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Volcker Testimony] (statement of Hon. Paul A. Volcker, 
Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board). 
13 Id. at 6. 
14 Id. 
15 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform. 
16 Id. 
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equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, 
unrelated to serving their customers.”17 
Freshman Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Or.) and Senior Senator Carl 
Levin (D-Mich.) took up President Obama’s call for implementation 
of the Volcker Rule in Congress and cosponsored the Merkley-Levin 
Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. 
As proposed, the Volcker Rule was limited in scope.  It would 
affect trading activities only by insured depository institutions and 
their affiliates.18  The regulations would have no direct impact on 
funds and investments that are not “systemically important.”  
Chairman Volcker testified before the Senate Banking Committee that 
funds that were not “systemically important” (of which there are 
thousands) will be “free to trade, to innovate, to invest—and to fail,” 
as they should in a free market system.19  The Chairman also 
emphasized that commercial banks would remain free to offer a wide 
range of traditional and profitable services.20  These include basic 
payment services such as ATM machines and cash balance 
management services; safe and liquid depository facilities; extending 
credit to individuals, governments, and businesses, including 
originating and securitizing mortgages, commercial lending, 
underwriting and market-making activities; maintaining brokerage 
accounts, including “prime brokerage,” investment management, and 
advisory services, including “funds of funds,” trust and estate 
planning, and safe keeping of valuables.21 
A brief review of banking regulations and banking practices that 
led to the 2008 recession illustrates why the Group of Thirty, 
President Obama, and Senators Levin and Merkley, among others, 
thought that passing a strong form of the Volcker Rule, limiting risk 
in bank investments, was crucial to protecting the stability of our 
economy. 
 
17 Id. 
18 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) (Supp. 2011) (defining the banking entity as “any insured 
depository institution”). 
19 Volcker Testimony, supra note 12, at 50. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 57. 
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B.  Background: Why We Need the Volcker Rule 
Since the founding of the United States, banks and the government 
have been engaged in a delicate courtship influenced by centuries of 
debate about the appropriate relationship between the two.  After the 
Great Depression, there was a flurry of economic regulation, with the 
passage of the Banking Act of 1933, the centerpiece of which was the 
Glass-Steagall Act.22  The Glass-Steagall Act essentially severed the 
relationship between commercial banks and investment banks.23  
Over the next sixty years, our economy grew and globalized, while 
our regulatory structure remained largely unchanged.24 
In the 1990s, under the Clinton administration, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission released a paper suggesting that the 
burgeoning complex derivative swap market should be regulated.25  
Response to the report was swift; lobbyists met with the 
Commissioners at least thirteen times in the two months following 
release of the report.26  They warned that imposing regulations on the 
market could have dire consequences, and that the trades are so 
sophisticated that bank self-regulation was the only appropriate way 
to control them.27  At a congressional hearing on the report, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan likened the Commission’s 
proposal to “trying to punch the capital markets in the nose.”28 
Instead of strengthening financial regulation, Congress further 
deregulated the financial industry.  The movement towards 
deregulation culminated in Congress’s 1999 repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act’s restrictions on high-risk speculative investments.29  
The largely unregulated derivative swap market grew from $28.7 
 
22 MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK 20 (2010). 
23 Id. 
24 PBS NewsHour: As Economy Jitters Persist, Geithner “Confident We’re Going to 
Grow,” (PBS television broadcast July 6, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/geithner_07-06.html). 
25 Jake Bernstein & Sharona Coutts, Former Clinton Official Says Democrats, Obama 
Advisers Share Blame for Market Meltdown, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 2008, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/former-clinton-official-says-democrats-obama-advisers  
-share-blame-for-marke. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Daniel Weeks, Opinion, Wall Street’s Influence Weakened Volcker Rule, ROLL CALL 
(Aug. 3, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_16/-48921-1.html. 
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trillion in 1998 to $531.2 trillion a decade later.30  By 2010, ten 
percent of Goldman Sachs’s revenue came from proprietary trading.31 
In 2007, the housing bubble burst, revealing a host of risky lending 
and investing practices.  The decline in housing prices produced a 
domino effect of economic ruin across the economy.32  In 2008, 
Former Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig, testified before 
a Senate Committee that “[t]he paradigm of the last decade has been 
the conviction that un- or under-regulated financial services sectors 
would produce more wealth, net-net.  If the system got sick, the 
thinking went, it could be made well through massive injections of 
liquidity.  This paradigm has not merely shifted—it has imploded.”33 
Like other private companies, banks suffered tremendous losses 
when the economy entered a recession.  However, banks are not like 
other private companies.  Banks are central to the national and global 
economy, and when their investments fail, the effects can be dire.  A 
bank’s primary purpose is to operate as the intermediary for securing 
loans between individuals or businesses and creditors.34  The 
financial sector accounts for twenty percent of gross domestic 
product35 and is central to all financial transactions. 
The impending collapse of many of the nation’s largest banks 
prompted the government to acknowledge that there are some private 
entities so central to the economy that if they were to fail, the results 
could be disastrous.  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
believed that without intervention, the recession “could have rivaled 
or surpassed the Great Depression.”36  Fear of another Depression led 
Congress to pass TARP in October 2008, which allowed the U.S. 
Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion worth of troubled assets in 
many industries, including the financial industry.37  Proponents 
 
30 Bernstein & Coutts, supra note 25. 
31 Jia Lynn Yang, Banks Gird for Financial Overhaul’s Ban on Speculating with Their 
Own Money, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn 
/content/article/2010/08/13/AR2010081303688.html. 
32 S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. III, at 40–42 (2010). 
33 Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement 
of Eugene A. Ludwig, Chief Executive Officer, Promontory Financial Group). 
34 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD xviii (2010). 
35 Id. at 6. 
36 Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech to the 
43rd Annual Alexander Hamilton Awards Dinner (Apr. 8, 2010). 
37 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: TWO YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (2010). 
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justified the bailout of several of the nation’s largest financial 
institutions on the ground that some companies are simply “too big to 
fail.”38 
In a fractious political environment, distaste for the bailout was 
almost universal.  President Obama described TARP as necessary, but 
“as popular as a root canal.”39  Reflecting Wall Street’s and the 
public’s distaste for the bailout, the Dow fell 157 points the day after 
President Bush signed TARP.40 
Only about $428 billion of the allotted $700 billion rescue package 
was or will be disbursed, and $278 billion of that had been repaid by 
December 2011.41  In December 2011, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the net cost of the TARP program would be $32 
billion,42 much less than initially projected.43  Yet the risks of 
government bailouts and more importantly, the effect that the 
practical assurance of future government bailouts would have on 
banking practices ought to cause the government to consider 
structural reform that would avoid future government bailouts. 
In a financial system in which the largest financial institutions 
enjoy at least an implied government guarantee against failure, the 
question should be how to regulate the financial system.  If the 
government is going to be on the hook to bail out bank losses, the 
government needs to oversee the banks and impose regulations to 
limit the risk of loss in order to prevent the need for bailouts in the 
 
38 John Crawley & Rachelle Younglai, Congressional Oversight Panel: TARP Helped 
Perpetuate a ‘Too Big to Fail’ System, HUFFINGTON POST (March 16, 2011, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/16/wachdog-tarp-too-big-to-fail_n_836376.html 
(“Federal intervention transformed the notion of ‘too big to fail’ into a stark reality.”); see 
also Another Accounting of TARP, GOP.GOV (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.gop.gov/policy   
-news/10/12/06/another-accounting-of-tarp. 
39 TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 37, at i (noting that President 
Obama commented on TARP that “[i]f there’s one thing that has unified Democrats and 
Republicans, and everybody in between, it’s that we all hated the bank bailout.  I hated it.  
You hated it.  It was about as popular as a root canal.”). 
40 David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. 
41 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM––
DECEMBER 2011, http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-16-TARP 
_report.pdf. 
42 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM––
MARCH 2012, at 1, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-28-2012 
TARP.pdf. 
43 Robert Bowen, Wall Street Bailout (TARP) Cost Taxpayers Less than Projected, 
EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/wall-street-bailout-tarp 
-cost-taxpayers-less-than-projected. 
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future.  When it passed, Democrats pledged that TARP was only the 
first half of a plan to rescue the economy and that they would proceed 
to enact a “sweeping overhaul” of the financial regulatory system.44 
In reforming the regulation of the financial industry, the 
government needed to strike a balance that would not upset the free 
market system or America’s ability to remain competitive and 
innovative in the global economy.45  At the same time, sufficient 
safeguards were needed to ensure that such risks would “not again 
imperil our nation’s economic well-being.”46 
Congress’s solution was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.47  At 848 pages, it has been hailed as “the 
most substantial reform of the country’s financial system since the 
Great Depression.”48  The scope of the Act is ambitious; the preamble 
of the Act describes its purpose as, “To promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices.”49  The Act attempts to minimize 
systemic risk and conflicts of interest, to end taxpayer bailouts of 
companies perceived to be “too big to fail,” and to create a 
comprehensive regulatory oversight scheme.50 
C.  The Amendment as Proposed 
As introduced, the Merkley-Levine amendment to the Dodd-Frank 
Act would have codified the Volcker Rule as the Group of Thirty 
initially recommended and as President Obama endorsed.  The 
Volcker Rule distinguishes between permissible and impermissible 
bank trading activities.  The Amendment begins with a broad 
 
44 Herszenhorn, supra note 40. 
45 See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 3. 
46 Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Senators Call on Regulators to Implement 
Strong Merkley-Levin Provisions (Oct. 28, 2010) (citing Letter from Hon. Paul Volcker, 
Chairman, President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., to the Members of the Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council (Oct. 28, 2010)), www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release 
/?id=be745ff9-1820-43df-978e-35809510cbac. 
47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
48 Editorial, A New Era for U.S. Finance, JAPAN TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://www 
.japantimes.co.jp/text/ed20100728a1.html. 
49 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
50 Id. 
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prohibition on proprietary trading and bank involvement in hedge 
funds, both practices that have been blamed for the economic crisis.  
Section 619 of the amendment declares that “a banking entity shall 
not—(A) engage in proprietary trading; or (B) acquire or retain any 
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge 
fund or a private equity fund.”51  The amendment defines “proprietary 
trading” as any trade in derivatives or securities in which the bank 
engages as a principle.52  This straightforward prohibition is preceded 
by language that could, and later did, render it largely toothless: 
“Unless otherwise provided in this section.”53 
The original amendment exempted certain trades from the 
prohibition, while still focusing on the intended purpose—risk 
mitigation and removal of conflicts of interest.  The amendment 
exempted the purchase and distribution of securities “in connection 
with underwriting, market-making, or in facilitation of customer 
relationships,” so long as the activities are not designed to exceed the 
“expected near term demands of clients.”54  Risk-mitigating hedging 
activities and investments in small businesses designed to promote the 
public welfare were permitted.55  The amendment permitted 
proprietary trading outside of the United States if a U.S. citizen does 
not control the company that is engaging in the trading.56  Finally, the 
amendment permitted acquisition of an equity or ownership interest in 
a hedge fund that is solely outside the United States so long as no 
ownership interest in the fund is offered to a resident of the United 
States.57 
To ensure that these permitted activities would not hamper the 
ultimate purpose of the amendment—to limit risk in banking 
investments—the proposed amendment placed limitations on the 
permitted activities.  The permitted activities would not be allowed if 
the transaction would cause a conflict of interest between the financial 
institution and its clients, would unsafely expose the financial 
institution to high-risk assets or trading strategies, would pose a threat 
 
51 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, sec. 13(a)(1) (2011). 
52 Id. sec. (i)(4). 
53 Id. sec. (a)(1). 
54 Id. sec. (d)(1)(b). 
55 Id. secs. (d)(1)(C), (E). 
56 Id. sec. (d)(1)(G). 
57 Id. sec. (d)(1)(H). 
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to the soundness of the financial institution, or would threaten the 
financial stability of the United States.58 
The proposed amendment also placed limitations on the permitted 
relationships financial institutions may enter into with hedge funds 
and private equity funds.  Hedge funds and private equity funds are 
those that trade in securities on behalf a small number of wealthy 
investors.59  Macro hedge funds make speculative investments, 
usually based on complex economic or mathematical calculations, 
designed to find inequalities in the market.60  Hedge funds frequently 
bet on exchange rate devaluations, interest rate changes, and 
macroeconomic movements.61  Furthermore, hedge funds are often 
highly leveraged in the hope of further magnifying their profits.62 
Banks may be motivated to bail out failing hedge funds to 
minimize the reputational risks of being associated with a failing 
fund.63  The proposed Merkley-Levin Amendment’s hedge fund 
restrictions are designed to remove the incentive for banks to bail out 
failing hedge funds with which they are affiliated. 
The proposed amendment would have prohibited banking entities 
that serve, directly or indirectly, as the investment advisor of a hedge 
or private equity fund from entering into a covered transaction with 
the fund.64  This proposal would have helped to regulate conflicts of 
interest by classifying hedge funds managed by banking institutions 
as affiliates of those banking institutions. 65  The amendment would 
have also prohibited hedge funds from sharing the name of a banking 
entity.66 
Section 619B of the amendment addresses conflicts of interest.  
The amendment first placed a general ban on engaging in trading that 
would create a conflict of interest between the banks and their 
 
58 Id. secs. (d)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
59 See KEVIN DOWD, CATO INST., TOO BIG TO FAIL? LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 2 (1999), http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs 
/bp52.pdf; see also discussion infra Part V.B. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE 
FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 56 (2011) [hereinafter FSOC STUDY]. 
64 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, sec. (2)(f)(1) (2011). 
65 Id. sec. (f)(2). 
66 Id. sec. (g)(6)(C). 
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clients.67  It then directed a commission to issue rules to implement 
the ban on conflicts of interest.68  The proposed amendment 
concluded with an exception permitting financial institutions to enter 
into a transaction that creates a conflict of interest if the conflict is 
necessary for the bank to engage in risk-mitigating hedging 
activities.69 
As with the final version of the amendment, the proposed version 
left many details to be filled in by regulatory agencies. 
The proposed amendment laid out a strong framework to achieve 
the intended result—reducing the investments and conflicts of interest 
in today’s financial industry that create systemic risks.  The proposed 
amendment included limited exceptions for trades that are necessary 
for banks to serve clients and to engage in responsible risk-hedging 
betting, which would further strengthen the financial system.  The 
proposed amendment thoughtfully balanced the necessary regulations 
to protect taxpayers from being on the hook for bailouts and to protect 
consumers from unfair competition without placing U.S. financial 
institutions at a competitive disadvantage internationally.  The 
amendment, however, laid out broad principles rather than detailed 
instructions on how to realize those tenets. 
II 
THE POLITICS 
Despite the apparent need for financial reform, the 
recommendations by many of the world’s leading economists, a 
personal endorsement from Chairman Volcker, and a vow from 
President Obama that the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was “a fight [he was] ready to have,”70 support for the 
Act, and for the “common-sense” Volcker Rule in particular, was 
fractured. 
Support for the bill was largely split along party lines71 and it 
became clear that work on the bill would spill into a bitter election 
 
67 Id. § 619B, sec. (a). 
68 Id. sec. (b). 
69 Id. sec. (c). 
70 Obama, supra note 15. 
71 See CNN Poll: Americans Split on Two Top Obama Initiatives, CNN (June 2, 2010, 
2:57 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/02/cnn-poll-americans-split-on-top 
-two-obama-initiatives (noting that increased regulation was popular with Democrats and 
Independents but a bare majority of Republicans opposed increased regulation); see also 
Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010, 
GARY 7/24/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Creating a Future Economic Crisis: 1351 
Political Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule 
season, which would further deepen the political divide.  Republicans 
were not the only group against the bill; while the Act was a fight the 
President was ready to have, it was a fight that Wall Street was 
already waging.  Wall Street had already assembled a legion of 
lobbyists to wage battle on Capitol Hill. 
Wall Street dispatched two thousand lobbyists to Washington as 
part of a $600 million campaign to assure that their interests were 
well represented.72  In 2009, there were 13,676 registered and active 
lobbyists in Washington,73 which means that roughly fifteen percent 
of all the active lobbyists in Washington were lobbying on behalf of 
Wall Street interests.  While the Act passed, Republicans and Wall 
Street lobbyists succeeded in weakening the Volcker Rule by 
inserting loopholes. 
Legislation reflects the efforts of people and diverse groups and is 
the result of compromise.74  Several political theories attempt to 
explain the external and internal forces at work in the political 
process.75  These theories can generally be divided between those that 
attempt to explain the process through the activity of interested 
groups, and those that explain legislation as the result of the internal 
structures of government.76 
A.  Interest Group Theories 
Interest group theory is a normative political theory that attempts to 
explain legislative results through the external interest groups that 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071500464 
.html (noting that the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 60–39, with three Republican 
senators, including Senator Scott Brown, supporting the bill and only one Democrat voting 
against because it “didn’t go far enough”). 
72 Weeks, supra note 29. 
73 Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index 
.php (last updated Apr. 26, 2012). 
74 Donald J. Boudreaux & Dwight R. Lee, Politics as the Art of Confined Compromise, 
16 CATO J. 365, 365–66 (1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n3-6 
.html.  Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain noted of political compromise: “But 
compromise is not a mediocre way to do politics; it is an adventure, the only way to do 
democratic politics.”  Id. 
75 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 48 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that interest 
group theories, proceduralist theories, and institutional theories attempt to describe the 
congressional process). 
76 Id. 
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influence Congress.77  The notion that interest groups will play an 
important role in the political process dates from the founding of our 
country.  James Madison addressed the inevitability of the formation 
of factions, groups of citizens motivated by common self-interests 
that are contrary to the common good.78  Madison quickly dismissed 
the threat of minority factions, arguing that our majoritarian form of 
government would be sufficient to protect against minority factions.79  
Madison also argued that the organization of the political process 
would protect minorities from the imposition of the will of a majority 
faction.80 
Interest group theory hinges on three assumptions: (1) citizens 
organize into groups based on common interests for political action, 
(2) this results in a spreading of political power across the groups, and 
(3) policy makers enact policies that reflect the desires of interest 
groups.81  The theory holds that the overlap of interests and 
membership among the groups, and active competition between the 
groups, will help prevent one group from oppressing others.82 
In theory, the presence of active and organized interest groups 
competing in a system of standard rules will result in moderate, well-
considered public policy.83  Crucial to this view is that all interests are 
effectively represented.84  But more often than not, in reality, one 
interest group will be more powerful than the others and will be able 
to pass or block legislation that affects their interests, often at the 
expense of others.85 
Madison would likely be disappointed by the disproportionately 
strong influence certain minority factions, or interest groups, exert on 
the political process today.  In the fight over the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
interest groups broke down between Wall Street and “Main Street,” as 
 
77 See id. at 48–54. 
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
79 Id. at 75. 
80 Id. 
81 ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 49. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 50. 
85 Boudreaux & Lee, supra note 74.  “[N]ot all parties affected by political choices are 
represented at the political bargaining table. . . .  [T]he fact that many politically affected 
people are not party to these compromises means that political compromises are selective, 
at best.”  Id. 
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the media and politicians were fond of describing it.86  As it did in the 
1990s, Wall Street was still advocating for “self-regulation” of the 
financial market.87  Main Street, harmed by the excesses of Wall 
Street, wanted Congress to do something to prevent similar crises in 
the future. 
Several factors affect the influence certain groups will have on the 
political process.88  An analysis of these factors as split between Main 
Street and Wall Street will help to explain how interest groups 
influenced the final Volcker Rule. 
First, the number of members in an interest group influences its 
effectiveness.89  The Main Street interest group fighting for reform 
was greater in number than the Wall Street interest group.90  Main 
Street represents the “common American” who works or goes to 
school; many aligning with Main Street lost their jobs and savings 
because of Wall Street’s risky actions.  Only a very small percentage 
of Americans work on Wall Street. 
Strength in numbers can often be negated, however, when a group 
is diffuse, poorly organized, and lacks access to the political 
process.91  This means that the political system is less responsive to 
the concerns of consumers and other general citizens.92  Elmer 
Schattschneider, a pluralist skeptic, argued that “[t]he flaw in the 
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent.  Probably about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into 
 
86 See, e.g., Russ Choma, Wall Street’s New Weapon or Main Street Strikes Back?, 
OPENSECRETS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012 
/04/wall-streets-new-weapon-or-main-str.html; Suzy Khimm, Main Street Banks Break 
Away from Wall Street with Their Own SuperPAC, WONKBLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/main-street-banks-break-away-from 
-wall-street-with-their-own-superpac/2012/04/05/gIQAOpWexS_blog.html. 
87 See, e.g., Charles Reiger Gallagher III, Too Big to Fail: The Role of the Banking 
Lobby on Consumer Protection Laws, AVVO (Mar. 2012), http://www.avvo.com/legal       
-guides/ugc/too-big-to-fail-the-role-of-the-banking-lobby-on-consumer-protection-laws. 
88 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 49–65. 
89 See id. at 49–51. 
90 The “Main Street” lobby later evolved into the “99% lobby,” based on the belief that 
“99% of America” (Main Street) is paying for the excesses of the 1% (Wall Street).  See 
generally We Are the 99 Percent, http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com (last visited May 
17, 2012). 
91 Boudreaux & Lee, supra note 74 (“[P]olitical decisionmaking is overly sensitive to 
the demands of organized interest groups and relatively insensitive to the demands of 
unorganized groups.”). 
92 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34–35 (1960). 
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the pressure system.”93  The Main Street lobby consisted largely of 
the ninety percent that could not get into the system, and Wall Street, 
the well-connected upper class. 
The Main Street lobby was able to influence Congress by writing 
to its representatives or testifying before committees demanding 
relief—demanding that Congress take action to prevent similar 
economic catastrophes in the future.  But the “inattentive public” may 
be sated with legislation that is largely symbolic.94  While the Main 
Street lobby was united in its call for action, which Congress heeded, 
the lobby was fractured over what steps to take.  Wall Street, on the 
other hand, is a small, well-connected, well-organized, and extremely 
wealthy interest group that plainly possessed unique expertise in the 
topics the Dodd-Frank Act addresses.  Wall Street was united in its 
opposition to regulation and many members of the Main Street 
coalition actually joined Wall Street in opposing increased 
regulation.95 
The way interest groups formed in response to the Act lends 
credence to Mancur Olson’s interest group theory.96  Rather than the 
spontaneous formation of interest groups of the classic pluralist 
theory, Olson predicted that interest groups are most likely to form 
when there are a few interested members and each member has a 
large stake in the outcome.97  Bank risk is typically an issue that 
inspires little public action; however, the recession temporarily 
transformed the issue into one of great public interest, though the 
public had little expertise by which to judge the outcome of the 
legislative battle.98  While the people on Main Street would benefit 
from new financial regulations, the impact on them would be less 
direct than the impact on those on Wall Street.  Main Street will 
benefit in the long run from a more stable financial system.  Wall 
Street, however, feared that it would see reduced profits almost 
 
93 Id. at 35. 
94 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 53 (citing R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990)). 
95 CNN Poll, supra note 71.  Sixty percent of Americans favored increased federal 
regulation over Wall Street financial institutions, with thirty-eight percent opposed.  Id.  
Increased regulation was popular with Democrats and independents, but a bare majority of 
Republicans opposed increased regulation.  Id. 
96 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
97 See id. 
98 Kim Krawiec, Dodd-Frank by the Numbers: A Volcker Rule Case Study, FACULTY 
LOUNGE (July 21, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/07/dodd-frank  
-by-the-numbers-a-volcker-rule-case-study.html. 
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immediately as a result of regulation.99  This possible direct and 
immediate impact encouraged Wall Street’s organized and fervent 
lobbying effort.100 
While Main Street enjoyed the advantage in numbers, Wall Street 
won the interest group battle with its organized army of lobbyists and 
well-stocked political war chest.  Despite the large numbers on Main 
Street, “the pressure community [in Washington] is heavily weighted 
in favor of business.”101  Businesses naturally enjoy an advantage 
over citizen groups because they have the resources and organization 
to employ full-time professional lobbyists to work on their behalf.  In 
the case of the Wall Street lobby employed for the Dodd-Frank Act 
fight, in addition to Wall Street’s ability to deploy a legion of 
professional lobbyists on its behalf, Wall Street enjoyed close ties 
with many of the key political actors involved with the Act. 
There are many ways that interest groups can exert influence over 
the political process.  Interest groups can lobby members directly on 
issues that are important to them, and they can also form connections 
with the key players in Washington through campaign contributions.  
Wall Street has engaged in both of these strategies to grow its 
influence on Capitol Hill.  The close relationship between Wall Street 
and Capitol Hill led then-Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) 
to remark that “[the banks] frankly own the place.”102 
First, Wall Street has been forging relationships with the 
playmakers in Washington for decades.  From 1990 to 1998, during 
the Clinton Administration debate over regulating Wall Street and the 
successful repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, Wall Street contributed 
$232 million to federal political candidates.103  In the decade since 
then, Wall Street has nearly tripled its campaign giving to $686 
million, directing most of its contributions to whichever political 
party was in power.104  “The leading beneficiaries of Wall Street’s 
 
99 See Robin Sidel et al., Financial Firms Fear Revenue Loss, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423204575017543293379422 
.html. 
100 Id. (“Bank executives scrambled . . . to interpret Mr. Obama’s remarks, assess their 
potential impact and begin mobilizing their political weight in Washington for an 
upcoming fight over the proposals.”). 
101 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 68 (1986). 
102 Weeks, supra note 29. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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[political contributions] . . . were members of the oversight 
committees charged with regulating the financial system.”105 
In addition to raising and donating money to political campaigns, 
Wall Street can also tempt politicians—and their staff—with lucrative 
positions if they push for favorable policies.  Following the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act, two of the lead sponsors of the repealing 
legislation and hundreds of staffers who worked on the bill accepted 
jobs lobbying for Wall Street.106 
Ultimately, the most powerful factor in the political process is 
inertia.107  Interest groups advocating to maintain the status quo enjoy 
an advantage from the start, regardless of number, wealth, or 
organization.108  Passing legislation requires agreement between a 
large number of people, all representing diverse beliefs and 
backgrounds.  As a result, preservation of the status quo is the easiest 
result to achieve because building consensus for specific change is at 
best challenging, and often impossible.  The pull towards maintaining 
the status quo is particularly strong when the status quo clearly serves 
the interests of a strong and active interest group at the expense of a 
less organized interest group.109 
During the debate over regulation in the 1990s, Wall Street’s 
powerful lobby succeeded in establishing a financial sector that was 
essentially free from meaningful regulation.110  Lawmakers and 
regulators were able to see the possible consequences of allowing the 
financial industry to operate with minimal regulatory oversight; but at 
the urging of Wall Street’s lobby, and without a tangible crisis to 
rouse the passions of Main Street, Congress opted to keep the enemy 
it knew, rather than accept the unknown risks that increased 
regulation might pose.  In the Dodd-Frank fight, the status quo 
aligned with Wall Street’s interests, not Main Street’s, further tipping 
the scales in Wall Street’s favor. 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 David Rothkopf, Inertia You Can Believe In, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 25, 2010,     
12:15 PM), http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/25/inertia_you_can_believe 
_in (noting that Henry Kissinger observed that inertia is the most powerful force in 
American politics). 
108 See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 101, at 314–15. 
109 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 57, 62 (stating that organized interest groups are 
more likely to form to derail legislation with broadly distributed benefits and concentrated 
costs, and groups opposing legislation enjoy an advantage because of the organization of 
the political process). 
110 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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In the aftermath of the collapse of 2008, the momentum for change 
was strong enough to overcome the pull of the status quo, but the 
natural inclination to maintain the status quo, and the organizational 
and resource advantages enjoyed by Wall Street, was sufficient to 
allow members of Congress to weaken the Volcker Rule by inserting 
loopholes. 
Congress reacted to the competing interest groups by trying to find 
a middle ground pleasing both sides.  Congress heeded the call of 
Main Street and passed something, but allowed Wall Street to 
influence what that something would look like.  Passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act was hailed as a victory for Main Street America.111  And it 
was, in that any reforms were passed at all.  But ultimately, the final 
version of the bill was a victory for Wall Street. 
B.  Procedural Theories 
Procedural political theories can help explain how certain 
individual members of Congress were able to exert disproportionate 
influence over the content of the bill.112  There are many steps in the 
political process that a bill must navigate in order to become a law.  
Bills must pass out of committees, often more than one, and both 
chambers of Congress, and be signed by the President.113  If a bill 
fails any of these steps, it does not become a law.114  It is these steps, 
sometimes called vetogates115 for their ability to shut down 
legislation, that make the status quo so difficult to overcome.  
Proponents of legislation must succeed at each step in the process in 
order for their proposal to become law, while opponents of proposals 
need only succeed at one step in order to block the proposal from 
becoming law.116  In the 102nd Congress, of the more than 11,000 
bills introduced, only approximately fourteen percent were reported 
out of committee.117 
 
111 After the Act’s passage, President Obama declared “the American people will never 
again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.”  Obama, supra note 15. 
112 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 29. 
113 I’M JUST A BILL (SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK!), YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0 (uploaded Sept. 1, 2008). 
114 Id. 
115 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7, 18 (1994). 
116 ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 62. 
117 STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 99 (4th ed. 2006); see also 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 29 (stating that the Committee process transfers power from 
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It is at each of these vetogates that individual members can find 
themselves thrust into the center of debate over a bill with the power 
to block it from moving forward.118  Members who are generally not 
playmakers can find themselves with the singular power to block a 
proposal, even a proposal as important and expansive as the Dodd-
Frank Act.  In order to pass through a vetogate, proponents of a 
proposal may need either to remove or to insert certain provisions into 
the bill in order to gain the support of those who control the 
vetogate.119  This aspect of our political system allows interest groups 
to effect significant changes in proposals by exerting their influence 
on a few select members of Congress who find themselves with the 
power to block or pass the proposal.120 
While the Senate was considering the Volcker Amendment, 
Senator Scott Brown changed the political make up of the Senate in a 
stunning special election victory.121  Freshman Senator Scott Brown 
(R-Mass.), who replaced the late Lion of the Senate, Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-Mass.),122 found himself at the heart of the Volcker Rule 
debate. 
With a Republican holding Senator Kennedy’s seat, Senate 
Democrats were one seat shy of the sixty-seat majority needed to 
defeat a Senate filibuster.123  This change in the political makeup of 
the Senate made Senator Brown’s vote highly sought after, 
particularly since Senator Brown publicly declared his belief that the 
Senate needed to enact measures to overhaul the financial system to 
prevent another collapse.124  Senator Brown, however, was 
 
the chamber majority to a small number of lawmakers, particularly committee chairs); 
Paul Singer, Members Offered Many Bills but Passed Few, ROLL CALL (Dec. 1, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_61/-30466-1.html (noting that the 110th 
Congress proposed 14,000 bills, the most of any Congress since 1980, but only 3.3% were 
signed into law, the lowest percentage since 1976). 
118 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 67. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (“Because legislation can be stopped at many points along the legislative path, 
groups [trying to block a proposal] need to secure the assistance of only one key player to 
succeed.”). 
121 Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/us/politics/21elect.html. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Press Release, Senator Scott Brown, Statement on Financial Regulation Cloture 
Vote (May 19, 2010), http://scottbrown.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?ContentRecord 
_id=9967cc52-6187-40e2-a11e-5c5c30f3d0ff&ContentType_id=c705917c-84f4-49fd-a 
587-420cd0fcc26f&096fa988-9da3-4a1a-87bc-4ee9d9c2ef47&Group_id=34087a75-290f  
-488b-97a4-2314e6991fb5&MonthDisplay=5&YearDisplay=2010. 
GARY 7/24/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Creating a Future Economic Crisis: 1359 
Political Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule 
particularly concerned about the effect that the proposed Volcker 
Rule would have on Massachusetts banks.125  He announced the price 
of his support: the bill could not be funded by new taxes on banks126 
and businesses in Massachusetts must be able to continue to operate 
as they had been doing for decades.127 
Senator Brown’s concern for the Massachusetts banking industry is 
understandable.  Massachusetts is at the heart of the mutual fund 
industry.  The securities and investment industry was also the second 
largest industry to contribute to his political action committee, 
donating nearly $750,000,128 and his top individual contributor was a 
financial institution.129  His advocacy during the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act debate apparently 
pleased his securities and investment industry supporters because they 
donated nearly $2 million to his 2012 campaign.130 
III 
THE FINAL VERSION 
Changes to proposed bills are inevitable in a legislative process 
that requires political compromise.  Proponents of the political system 
contend that political compromise is necessary to produce well-
tempered public policy.131  But even to a seasoned political realist 
 
125 Id. 
126 Press Release, Senator Scott Brown, Brown Sends Letter to Dodd, Frank Opposing 
$19 Billion Bank Tax in Financial Reform Bill (June 29, 2010), http://scottbrown 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?ContentRecord_id=51d77c2f-5043-41c8-9020-38221 
a93aa40&ContentType_id=c705917c-84f4-49fd-a587-420cd0fcc26f&096fa988-9da3-4 
a1a-87bc-4ee9d9c2ef47&Group_id=34087a75-290f-488b-97a4-2314e6991fb5&Month 
Display=6&YearDisplay=2010. 
127 Press Release, Senator Scott Brown, Statement on Financial Regulation Cloture 
Vote (May 20, 2010), http://www.scottbrown.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2010/5/senator 
scottbrownstatementonfinancialregulationcloturevote. 
128 Senator Scott P. Brown 2005–2010, Top Industries, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/industries.php?cycle=2010&cid=N00031174&type
=I&newmem=N (last visited May 17, 2012). 
129 Senator Scott P. Brown 2005–2010, Top 20 Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/contrib.php?cycle=2010&type=I&cid=N00031174
&newMem=N&recs=20. 
130 Scott Brown 2011–2012, Top Industries, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open 
secrets.org/politicians/industries.php?cycle=2012&type=I&cid=N00031174&newMem 
=N&recs=20 (last visited May 17, 2012). 
131 See Orlando Patterson, Opinion, Affirmative Action: The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/22/opinion/affirmative-action-the-sequel.html 
?pagewanted=all&src=pm); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 49. 
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like Chairman Paul Volcker, the final version of the Volcker Rule was 
a disappointment.132  Chairman Volcker believes that the final 
version of the Act stops short of sufficiently curbing potentially 
problematic banking activities, particularly hedge fund investment.133  
“The [bill] went from what is best to what could be passed,” he 
said.134 
Many significant changes came after a nearly twenty-hour 
marathon House and Senate Conference Committee work session on 
the bill to meet a self-imposed deadline.135  The session began at 
10:00 a.m. on Thursday, June 24, 2010, and the final vote was not 
held until 5:40 a.m. on Friday.136 
The final version of the amendment keeps the same basic 
framework as the proposed version.  It begins with an unchanged 
broad prohibition on proprietary trading and hedge fund investing by 
banking entities.  The final version of the bill, however, adds 
significantly to the exceptions that were contained in the proposed 
version. 
Not all of the changes to the “permitted activities” weakened the 
proposal.  The original version of the amendment permitted banks to 
purchase and sell securities in connection with underwriting, market 
making, and vaguely, “in facilitation of customer relationships,” to 
the extent that the activities did not exceed the near term demands of 
clients.137  The final version removed transactions “in facilitation of 
customer relationships” from the permitted transactions.138  The final 
version also narrowed the broad edict of the original that permitted 
banking entities to engage in risk-mitigating hedging activities.  The 
final version requires that risk-mitigating hedging be “related to 
individual or aggregated positions, contracts or other holdings” that 
are designed to reduce specific risks.139  This change essentially 
outlines what the oversight agencies will consider when determining 
whether investments are “risk-mitigating hedging.” 
 
132 A New Era for U.S. Finance, supra note 47. 
133 Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud and Clear, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at BU1. 
134 Id. at BU7. 
135 Shahien Nasiripour, Financial Reform Bill Passes: Banks Keep Derivatives Units, 
Volcker Rules Softened; House-Senate Conference Passes Financial Reform Bill After 
Marathon Session, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2010, 7:37 AM), www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2010/06/25/financial-reform-bill-pas_n_625191.html. 
136 Id. 
137 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, sec. (d)(1)(B) (2011). 
138 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 2011). 
139 Id. § (d)(1)(C). 
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The most problematic change between the introduced version of 
the Merkley-Levin Amendment and the final version was that the 
final version expanded the permitted activities of regulated financial 
institutions.  In the original version, the banks were to be involved in 
hedge funds only if their interest was solely outside of the United 
States and no ownership interest in the fund was offered to a resident 
of the United States.  The final version rewrote the permitted hedge 
fund involvement exception, inserting a potentially large loophole. 
In addition to the initial hedge fund exception of the original 
version, the final version permits a bank entity to serve as a general 
partner, managing member, or trustee of a hedge fund, or to have a 
controlling interest in the hedge fund, if certain conditions are met.  
Banks may organize and invest in hedge funds and private equity 
funds up to a de minimis investment to facilitate customer services so 
long as the following is true: the hedge fund does not share a variation 
of the bank’s name, the bank provides bona fide investment advisory 
or trust services and the fund is organized only in connection with 
those services, the bank never acquires an interest in the fund beyond 
a de minimis investment, no employee or director of the banking 
entity has an ownership interest in the trust unless they are directly 
providing services to the fund, and the banking entity never 
guarantees or otherwise assumes the obligations of the trust.140  Even 
if all of these conditions are met, a bank’s involvement with a hedge 
fund may still be prohibited if its involvement exposes the banking 
entity to significant risk or creates a conflict of interest between the 
bank and its customers.141 
This potential loophole could permit banks to structure hedge fund 
units in a way to meet the conditions while still exposing the bank to 
risk of loss and providing incentive to bail out the fund if it fails.  The 
best way to prevent bank losses in hedge funds is to prohibit bank 
involvement with hedge funds entirely.  The final version does leave 
open the possibility of closing this loophole by allowing the 
regulatory agencies to promulgate any additional rules designed to 
insure that hedge fund losses are borne solely by the investors, not the 
banking entity. 
Under the final version of the bill, banks are permitted to operate 
hedge funds (with the above limitations), but banks are not allowed to 
 
140 FSOC STUDY, supra note 63, at 58 (summarizing 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(G)). 
141 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851 (d)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
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invest in hedge funds themselves.  Of course, there are exceptions.  
Those exceptions are that banking entities are permitted to retain an 
investment in a hedge fund in order (1) to establish the fund and to 
provide it with enough initial equity to attract unaffiliated investors 
and (2) to make de minimis investments.142  These two exceptions 
come with certain limitations. 
Enter Senator Scott Brown, the newest Senator representing the 
hub of asset management—Massachusetts.  The initial Volcker Rule 
prohibited banking entities from investing their own funds in hedge 
funds and proprietary trading with only very narrow exceptions.143  
But Senator Brown insisted on a compromise—that banking entities 
be allowed to invest a small amount of its own capital in the funds.144  
The initial compromise was to allow banking entities to “invest up to 
three percent of [a bank’s] tangible common equity in hedge funds 
and private equity firms.”145  Tangible common equity comprises 
shareholder equity and is “considered to be the strongest form of bank 
capital.”146 
Several hours into the marathon work session, in political 
maneuvering designed to hold on to key votes, Senator Brown 
succeeded in further amending the proposal.  Senator Brown’s 
amendment increased the amount of permissible investment from 
three percent of tangible common equity to three percent of Tier 1 
capital.147  With that small change in the text, Senator Brown 
increased the amount of capital that banking entities may place in 
risky investments by as much as eighty percent, depending on the 
bank.148 
As passed with Senator Brown’s amendment, the final bill limits 
banking entity investments in hedge funds and private equity funds in 
the following two ways: first, the banking entity’s investment in the 
fund cannot exceed more than three percent of the capital in the fund 
one year after the establishment of the fund; second, the aggregate of 
 
142 Id. § (d)(4)(A). 
143 See discussion supra Part I.C.; see also S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, secs. 13(a)(1), 
(d)(1)(b) (2011). 
144 David Cho et al., Lawmakers Guide Dodd-Frank Bill for Wall Street Reform Into 
Homestretch, WASH. POST, June 26, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com.wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062500675.html. 
145 Nasiripour, supra note 135. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 Id.; see also A New Era for U.S. Finance, supra note 47. 
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the banking entity’s interest in the fund cannot exceed three percent 
of the Tier 1 capital of the banking entity.149 
Three percent of any amount of capital may seem like a modest 
amount.  However, the primary banking entities that engage in hedge 
fund investing and proprietary trading, those whose impairment 
would pose the gravest threat to the United States financial system, 
deal in almost unimaginable amounts of capital.  The amendment 
would allow Bank of America, for example, the nation’s largest bank 
with more than $2.3 trillion ($2,300,000,000,000) in assets, to invest 
$4.8 billion in hedge funds and private equity funds, an increase of 
eighty percent over the amount that would have been allowed under 
the tangible common equity requirement.150  JPMorgan Chase is the 
nation’s second largest bank and has assets totaling more than $2.1 
trillion.151  Senator Brown’s change to Tier 1 capital increased the 
amount JPMorgan will be able to invest in hedge funds by $1.1 
billion, to $4 billion.152  BNY Mellon and State Street Corp., the 
thirteenth and nineteenth largest banks with $221 billion and $153 
billion in assets, respectively, directly lobbied Senator Brown to 
weaken the Volcker Rule.153 
A study completed by the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
found three reasons for the ban on hedge fund trading: (1) to ensure 
that banking entities do not use hedge funds to circumvent the 
Volcker prohibition on proprietary trading, (2) to confine banking’s 
private fund activities to those activities that are customer-related, and 
(3) to eliminate incentives and opportunities for banks to “bail out” 
funds that they sponsor or in which they invest.154  The original 
version flatly stated that “[n]o banking entity that serves, directly or 
indirectly, as the investment manager or investment adviser to a 
hedge fund or private equity fund may enter into a covered 
transaction” with the fund.155  The final version expands the base of 
entities that cannot invest in hedge funds by prohibiting sponsors and 
 
149 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I)–(II) (Supp. 2011). 
150 Nasiripour, supra note 135.  Additionally, “Morgan Stanley can invest $1.4 billion, a 
58% increase, while Goldman Sachs can invest $1.9 billion, an increase of just 10%” over 
the tangible equity standard.  Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 FSOC STUDY, supra note 63, at 6. 
155 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, sec. 13(f)(1) (2011). 
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affiliates of the fund from entering into covered transactions with the 
fund.156 
The final version of the Act then proceeds to permit banking 
entities, at the discretion of the regulatory agencies, to enter into any 
prime brokerage transaction with any hedge or private equity fund 
managed, sponsored, or advised by the bank if (1) the banking entity 
is in compliance with the above-described limitations, (2) the bank 
director certifies annually in writing that the bank is in compliance, 
and (3) the responsible regulatory agency has determined that such 
transactions do not jeopardize the “safe and sound operation” of the 
banking entity.157  By placing this provision at the discretion of the 
regulatory agencies, Congress has made it possible for this loophole 
to be closed in the agency rulemaking process. 
The enacted Merkley-Levin Amendment defines “banking entity” 
as an insured deposit institution, but excepts institutions that function 
solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity if (1) all or almost all deposits at 
the institution are in a trust fund and (2) no deposits are federally 
insured.158  This exemption, which was not included in the 
amendment as proposed, limits the scope of the bill only to those 
institutions in which the government has a stake through federal 
insurance. 
The enacted amendment prohibits banks from operating or 
investing in hedge funds that are completely divorced from their 
customers’ needs.  Bank involvement in hedge funds encourages 
banks to bail out failing funds to preserve the banks’ reputation.159  
Furthermore, the complexity of the financial market has made it 
difficult to evaluate the risk of hedge fund investments, making it 
hard for banks to invest prudently.  The amendment also attempts to 
curb the opportunities for banks to use hedge fund operations to 
circumvent the bans on proprietary trading. 
One of the crucial elements for effectively regulating hedge funds 
is how hedge funds are defined.  Hedge funds, by their nature, are 
slippery entities.  The final version of the Act defined hedge funds, 
proprietary trading, and illiquid funds (a special form of hedge fund) 
but provides leeway for the rulemaking agencies to alter the 
definitions as needed.160  As discussed below, crafting a careful 
 
156 12 U.S.C. § 1851(f)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
157 Id. §§ (f)(3)(A)(i)–(iii). 
158 Id. § (h)(1). 
159 FSOC STUDY, supra note 63, at 56. 
160 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(h)(2), (4), (7). 
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definition of hedge fund may be one of the most important tasks the 
regulatory agencies face as they attempt to fill in the details of the 
Act. 
IV 
REGULATORY RULEMAKING: A LONG ROAD AHEAD 
Following the marathon work session on the bill, a teary-eyed 
Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), Chair of the Senate Banking 
Committee and namesake of the bill, announced that “[n]o one will 
know until this is actually in place how it works.”161  Senator 
Merkley noted that the principle of the Volcker Rule was embodied in 
the final version of the Act, but that the effectiveness of the Rule will 
come down to the level of enforcement.162  “If those regulators are 
not vigilant,” he said, “we will have a giant loophole.”163  Chairman 
Volcker agreed, stating that “[t]he success of this approach is going to 
be heavily dependent on how aggressively and intelligently it is 
implemented.”164 
The next stage in the reform process is a two- to five-year 
rulemaking period in which at least a dozen regulatory agencies will 
need to research and write approximately 250 new regulations.165  
Each agency will be responsible for drafting the rules to which they 
have been tasked, with some regulations requiring cooperation 
between two or more agencies. 
A.  Public Choice Theory and the Agency Burden 
The final version of the Act, with broad prohibitions and large 
rulemaking responsibility delegated to the regulatory agencies to fill 
in details, was predictable given the economic cost-benefit 
distribution among the interest groups.  Public choice theory applies 
an economic model to the political process, assuming that politicians 
 
161 Cho, supra note 143. 
162 David Sarasohn, Op-Ed., The Bank Legislation, and Education, of Jeff Merkley, 
OREGONIAN (July 1, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/david 
_sarasohn/index.ssf/2010/07/the_bank_legislation_and_educa.html. 
163 Id. 
164 Uchitelle, supra note 133, at BU 7. 
165 SIFMA, DODD-FRANK RULEMAKING RESOURCE CENTER: OVERVIEW, 
http://www.sifma.org/Issues/Regulatory-Reform/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking/Overview (last 
visited May 11, 2012). 
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are rational utility maximizers.  The theory uses a supply and demand 
equation to predict or explain legislative outcomes.166 
Public choice theory assumes that the costs and benefits of any 
policy are distributed broadly or narrowly.167  The distribution of 
costs and benefits can be determined by whether the policy would 
benefit a large or a small group of people, and whether the costs of 
the policy would be felt widely or narrowly across the community.168  
Distribution of costs and benefits can help predict or explain the 
formation of interest groups on each side, and how strong and well 
organized those interest groups will be.169  Generally, the theory 
predicts that organized interest groups are more likely to form in 
response to policies with concentrated costs or benefits.170 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
has broadly distributed benefits, with the costs borne by a 
significantly smaller group.  The benefits are broadly distributed 
across the population because everyone will benefit from a stable 
economy and financial sector.  However, the small number of people 
on Wall Street will feel the costs of the regulations directly. 
Under the public choice theory, public policies with broad benefits 
and concentrated costs, like the Dodd-Frank Act, generally have well-
organized opposition, as was the case with the Wall Street lobby.  The 
resulting policy, then, tends to be only as strong as the minority 
bearing the costs is willing to pay.171 
Public choice theory also uses the cost-benefit distribution of 
policies to predict what the resulting legislation will look like.  The 
theory predicts that laws like the Dodd-Frank Act, with distributed 
benefits and concentrated costs, will be more ambiguous and leave 
more details to agency rulemaking than other types of policies.172  
Because policies with concentrated costs generally face better-
organized opposition, it is difficult for Congress to reach a consensus 
on specific details, which Congress then leaves to the agencies to 
 
166 See OLSON, supra note 96; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(1973). 
167 See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL 
MARKETS (1981). 
168 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 54–60. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 56–57 (“Proposals with distributed benefits and concentrated costs will 
face opposition, and the majority may impose its will on the minority, but only up to the 
capacity the minority can pay.”). 
172 See id. at 54–60. 
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work out.173  By passing broad legislation intended to convey 
distributed benefits, but without including any contentious detail, both 
sides of the debate can claim victory.  This allows politicians to curry 
favor with interest groups on both sides of the issue, which is 
essentially a victory for the politicians. 
This is exactly what happened with the Dodd-Frank Act.  Main 
Street demanded action, but the Wall Street Lobby made it nearly 
impossible for Congress to come to agreement on many details of the 
bill.  Congress then delegated the responsibility for filling in the 
details to regulatory agencies.  This delegation can result in agency 
capture.174  Agency capture occurs when the agency becomes 
beholden to the special interests it is tasked with regulating rather 
than to the public interests it was created to serve.  In this case, the 
level of detail left to the agencies gives the Wall Street and Main 
Street lobbies another opportunity to influence the ultimate form and 
reach of the Volcker Rule. 
B.  The Agency Burden 
The Dodd-Frank Act creates new agencies and also directs the 
regulatory agencies to complete studies and to adopt rules to 
implement the entire Dodd-Frank Act, including the Volcker Rule.  
The final bill directs agencies to consider the following factors in 
their studies: how to promote the soundness of banking entities, how 
to protect taxpayers and consumers, how to “limit the inappropriate 
transfer of Federal subsidies from institutions that benefit from 
deposit insurance and liquidity facilities of the Federal Government to 
unregulated entities,” how to limit activities that have caused undue 
risk and losses for banking entities, how to appropriately 
accommodate the insurance business while protecting affiliated 
banking entities, and how to time the divestiture of illiquid assets 
affected by the implementation of the Volcker Rule.175  The proposed 
amendment contained a directive that the agency rules “not 
unreasonably raise the cost of credit or other financial services[ or] 
 
173 See id. at 58–59. 
174 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050 (1997). 
175 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1621 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(1) (Supp. 2011)). 
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reduce the availability of credit or other financial services,”176 but this 
consideration for study was removed from the final bill. 
The Act permits the agencies “to impose additional capital 
requirements and restrictions . . . on any equity, partnership, or 
ownership interest in . . . a hedge fund . . . by a banking entity.”177  
The agencies may also impose additional requirements on banking 
entity/hedge fund relationships to ensure that losses sustained by the 
fund are borne by the investors in the fund, and not by the banking 
entity.  The agencies also are given broad discretion to regulate or 
prohibit any “other” activity the agencies determine would promote 
the soundness of banks and the U.S. financial system.178  The 
agencies may also impose additional limitations on permitted 
activities by rule if the agencies determine the activity would create a 
conflict of interest or expose the banking entity to high risk.179  The 
Act also gives agencies broad discretion to impose “additional capital 
requirements and quantitative limitations, including diversification 
requirements.”180 
The agencies are struggling with the broad scope of the rule and 
the lack of congressional guidance, as well as with coordinating the 
rules between the laundry list of agencies that have been tasked with 
formulating the regulations.  The Act created new agencies, such as 
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB),181 the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),182 and the Office of 
Financial Research (OFR, part of FSOC).183  These new agencies will 
join the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the 
Department of Education, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board (MSRB), the National Credit Union 
Administration Board (NCUAB), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in 
promulgating new banking regulations and completing studies.184  
 
176 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 619, sec. 13(b)(1)(A)(v) (2011). 
177 Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 124 Stat. at 1623 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(c)(5)). 
178 Id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1626 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J)). 
179 Id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1626 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(d)(2)(A)(i)–(ii)). 
180 Id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1626 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(3)). 
181 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. X. I, subtit. A. 
182 Id. tit. I, subtit. A. 
183 Id. subtit. B. 
184 SIFMA, supra note 165; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered section of the U.S. Code).  For a helpful chart 
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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury are 
not mentioned specifically in the Act, but they are also heavily 
involved in the oversight or operation of the U.S. financial system and 
economy.  These agencies coexist with independent state regulatory 
schemes and, for banks that also operate outside the United States, 
international regulations. 
With the congressional struggle to pass the Volker Rule in the past, 
a multitude of agencies now face the difficult task of working 
together to craft comprehensive and comprehensible rules regulating 
deeply entrenched, highly lucrative, yet poorly understood financial 
practices. 
C.  Closing the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule Through the 
Rulemaking Process 
1.  Another Opportunity for Interest Groups to Influence the Form of 
the Rule 
While the Volcker Rule is no longer before Congress, the debate 
continues.  Because so much was left to the agencies to craft, interest 
groups can still influence the scope and effect of the rule.  Critics of 
the Volcker Rule break down into two groups: those who believe that 
the rule itself, in any form, is ill-advised and those who feel that the 
Volcker Rule did not go far enough.  Both camps, no doubt, will try 
to influence the rulemaking process: those who oppose the rule will 
work to maintain or enlarge the loopholes, minimizing the rule’s 
impact on banking practices, and those who support the rule will work 
to close the loopholes and to strongly enact the underlying principles. 
Critics, as well as some supporters, of the rule warn against 
enacting a “draconian” form of the Volcker Rule with the concern 
that a poorly conceived rule could have unintended effects.185  
Regulators should be careful to avoid possible unwanted 
consequences, “such as reduced liquidity, higher funding costs for 
U.S. companies, less credit for small businesses, higher trading costs 
and lower investor returns, less ability to transfer risk, and 
 
illustrating the new regulatory structure, see Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 
2012, at 21, 23. 
185 Halah Touryalai, Volcker Rule Will Hit Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Hardest, 
FORBES (Oct. 7, 2011, 2:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2011/10/07 
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competitive disadvantages for U.S. banks relative to foreign 
banks.”186 
In addition to possible unintended consequences that the rule may 
have on the economy, simply implementing the Volcker Rule would 
cost national banks almost one billion dollars “for compliance and 
capital,” according to an impact analysis conducted by the OCC.187  
Furthermore, Moody’s Investors Services has stated that the rule 
would be considered a “credit negative” for bondholders of several of 
the largest banking firms that have “substantial market-making 
operations,” including Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley.188 
Other critics believe that the Volcker Rule’s focus on proprietary 
trading is misplaced, instead placing the blame for the financial crisis 
on real estate trading.  Less than twenty-five percent of bank lending 
in 1965 was to real estate; that number rose to fifty-five percent in 
2005.189  Reduced diversification of bank investments makes the 
health of the banking system dependent on whatever market 
comprises the majority of banking investments, in this case, real 
estate.190  Hence, when the real estate market crashed, the banks 
followed. 
Supporters of the rule, such as MIT economist Simon Johnson, 
believe that the Volcker Rule was too watered down in the legislative 
process to have much of an effect on banking practices or to 
adequately restrict proprietary trading, regardless of what rules are 
implemented.191  But officials at the top banks say that they are 
already feeling the effects of the restrictions.192  In anticipation of the 
 
186 Id. 
187 Silla Brush, Volcker Rule Will Cost Banks $1 Billion, U.S. Government Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28 
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188 Wes Goodman, Volcker Rule Is “Credit Negative” for U.S. Banks, Moody’s Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2011, 10:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-10 
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189 Peter J. Wallison, Volcker Rule Is Stuck in a Bygone Era, AM. BANKER (Nov. 9, 
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rules and effective dates, some banks attempted to come into 
compliance with some of the broader declarations of the Act almost 
immediately after President Obama signed it.  Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America, among others, announced 
plans to wind down their proprietary trading desks before regulators 
released proposed rules or even studies.193  At the end of the third 
quarter of 2011, the value of Bank of America’s private equity 
investments was $1.8 billion, compared to $4.8 billion only one year 
earlier.194  Banks are concerned that what value now remains in their 
private equity investments will be more difficult to sell at a good 
price.195  A top official with the American Banker’s Association is 
concerned that divestiture of certain assets at the same time across the 
market may cause liquidity problems in those markets.196 
Some traders in the bank’s proprietary trading branches are leaving 
on their own, citing diminished earning opportunities197 because they 
would no longer be able to make commissions on certain trades under 
the Volcker Rule.198  Some traders will transfer to other bank 
branches, but others are leaving to work for nonbank affiliated hedge 
funds and trading houses.199  In the six months following the Act’s 
approval, before the agencies released any studies or proposed rules, 
Goldman Sachs lost eleven traders in their proprietary trading branch 
operations to nonbank affiliated hedge or private equity funds.200 
The banks’ moves to shutter their proprietary trading offices and 
traders’ jumps to private firms may be premature.  The chief financial 
officer of Goldman Sachs said that market inefficiencies created by 
the Volcker Rule might make trading more profitable, which was not 
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the drafter’s intent.201  But more importantly, the Act lays out a 
timeline for the regulatory agencies to conduct more than twenty 
studies202 and to draft and implement the rules, so the final form of 
the rule is not yet set.  The rules are scheduled to be finalized before 
the July 2012 effective date of the Act,203 but Congress might extend 
that deadline.  Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) expressed concern 
that the “unrealistic” deadlines set forth in the Act is forcing agencies 
“to focus on speed rather than deliberation” and that the Senate is 
considering extending the timeline for the agencies’ rulemaking.204  
Before the final rules are released, the agencies will produce studies 
and proposed rules, which will be followed by a public comment 
period.  The public comment period provides the best opportunity for 
lobbyists, including Wall Street, to again influence the content and 
extent of the Volcker Rule. 
2.  The Agencies Struggle to Craft Clear Directives 
In January 2011, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
released the Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds 
and Private Equity Funds as directed by section 619 of the Act.205  
The study was intended to help the agencies draft rules that will 
protect taxpayers and consumers, promote the safety of the banking 
system, and reduce conflicts of interest.206  The agencies considered 
the study while drafting the proposed rules,207 which were released in 
October 2011.  The Act requires that the rules become effective one 
year after the issuance of the final rules, or two years after enactment 
of section 619 of the Act, and provides a grace period of up to several 
years for institutions to come into compliance.208 
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To assist with the study, the FSOC solicited comments from the 
public.  The Council received nearly eight thousand comments during 
a one-month period.209  Most comments urged strong implementation 
of the Volcker Rule.210  The FSOC summarized the letters as largely 
urging the agencies to implement the Volcker Rule so as to (1) 
unambiguously prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading 
and investing in hedge funds, (2) define terms so as to eliminate 
potential loopholes, and (3) to provide clearer guidance to banking 
entities as to permitted and prohibited conduct.211 
The study makes broad declarations and, rather than making 
concrete suggestions, lays out a series of possible paths that agencies 
may take while promulgating rules.  Those declarations demonstrated 
that the FSOC appreciates the general principles underlying the 
Volcker Rule.  The study encouraged agencies to strive to close 
potential loopholes through rulemaking and to effect the strongest 
regulations possible to prevent proprietary trading and to reduce 
conflicts of interest, while respecting the permitted market making 
and hedging activities that will ultimately strengthen our financial 
system. 
The study lays out five broad principles to which agencies should 
adhere when drafting the Volcker rules.  Those principles are: (1) 
agencies should use all necessary tools to prohibit improper 
proprietary trading, (2) rules should be flexible to respond to evolving 
financial products, trading practices, and hedging strategies, (3) rules 
should “enable comparisons among banking entities” to ensure the 
regulations do not result in “uneven competitive dynamics,” (4) rules 
should be clear enough that banking entities may easily discern 
between permitted and prohibited activities, and (5) rules should take 
into account differences between asset classes, such as different 
strategies for hedging risk and the volume of the transactions.212 
The restrictions on bank affiliation with hedge funds are guided by 
the same purposes underlying the restrictions on proprietary trading: 
(1) separate federal support for crucial financial institutions from 
speculative investing, (2) reduce risk to board-supervised financial 
entities, and (3) reduce potential conflicts of interest between 
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customers and their banking institutions.213  These considerations are 
ultimately intended to prevent the need for TARP-like legislation in 
the future, protecting the government from intervening when 
speculative investments threaten the integrity of banking entities that 
are crucial providers of credit in our economy.214 
Beyond reiterating the Volcker Rule’s underlying principles, the 
FSOC’s study provided few concrete examples of how the agencies 
might draft the rules in order to most effectively promote those 
principles.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) also 
released a study that revealed the agency’s struggle with the scope of 
the Act.  The GAO based its analysis on data gathered between 2006 
and 2010 from standalone proprietary trading desks at the six largest 
U.S. bank holding companies.215  The study, which was of a more 
limited scope than mandated by the Act, addressed (1) the 
information available on the risk and conflict of interest with 
proprietary trading as well as the Act’s possible effects on proprietary 
trading, and (2) how regulators have overseen proprietary trading in 
the past and the challenges they face in implementing the Volcker 
Rule restrictions.216  The GAO had difficulty collecting the 
information necessary to finish its study, leading the agency to 
conclude that agencies should collect and review even more 
information on proprietary trading before drafting the proposed 
rules.217 
The study did, however, largely endorse the recommendations that 
the FSOC outlined in its study, particularly that the primary challenge 
facing the agencies will be how to distinguish between prohibited 
proprietary trading and permitted market making activities as well as 
how to define relevant terms.218  The GAO also agreed with the 
FSOC that regulating agencies should use certain quantitative metrics, 
such as revenue and customer flow, to monitor more complicated 
prohibited transactions, such as customer transactions combined with 
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proprietary positioning.219  Going a step beyond the FSOC study, the 
GAO recommended that the FSOC direct the Office of Financial 
Research to compile more information on trading practices before the 
agencies issue the final rules.220 
The GAO advocated for strong oversight because it concluded that 
the risks of stand-alone proprietary trading outweigh any benefits,221 
despite acknowledging weaknesses in the data it analyzed.222  
Senators Merkley and Levin stated that they were disappointed with 
the GAO study because, by studying only the six largest bank holding 
company trading practices, the agency failed to capture the scope that 
Congress intended the rule to have.223  The GAO also aggregated the 
results of its study, concluding that the activity resulted in losses, 
while in fact, four of the six firms studied ultimately profited from 
proprietary trading.224 
The FDIC, the SEC, and the Federal Reserve released the first draft 
of the proposed Volcker rules in October 2011;225 the first draft was 
no more illuminating than the FSOC and GAO studies.  The proposed 
rules posed more questions than they answered.  Even though the 
principles behind the Volcker Rule are complicated, the length and 
complexity of the Volcker Rule seems to expand almost exponentially 
as it passes through each level of government.226  Chairman Volcker 
outlined his proposal to the President in three pages; section 619 of 
 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 See id.  For example, stand-alone desks saw small revenue during good years and 
large losses during the recession ($15.6 billion in revenue over thirteen quarters of gain but 
losses over five quarters of $15.8 billion for a total of $221 million in lost revenue over the 
period), and while generating the same amount of revenue as other trading practices, 
proprietary trading involves much higher risk.  Id. 
222 Those weaknesses include a small data set, the inability of some companies to report 
revenue data for some trades, and the exemption from the Volcker Rule of some of the 
trading activity analyzed.  See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 Bruce Watson, Volcker Rule Made Simple: Banks Can’t Gamble With Our Money 
(Probably), DAILYFINANCE (Oct. 12, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011 
/10/12/volcker-rule-made-simple-banks-cant-gamble-with-our-money. 
226 See Ben Protess, Volcker Rule Divides Regulators, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 16, 
2011, 9:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/volcker-rule-divides-regulators 
(“While the Volcker Rule itself ‘would be a worthy study for Talmudic Scholars, 
complicate this with five agencies having to write the rules and you have geometric 
expansion of complexity.’” (quoting FDIC Board to Consider Volcker Rule Proposal on 
October 11, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services 
/regulatory-services/publications/fdic-volcker-proposal.jhtml (last visited May 12, 2012)). 
GARY 7/24/2012  2:15 PM 
1376 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 1339 
the Act, which codifies the Volcker Rule, is ten pages; the proposed 
regulations consumes 298 pages.  The rule is so complex that a “rule 
map” produced by law firm Davis Polk to help clients understand the 
Volcker Rule has 355 distinct steps.227 
The Wall Street Journal described the proposed rules as “regulators 
essentially wonder[ing] out loud how they can possibly write this 
rule.”228  The proposed rules include 383 questions, many with 
multiple parts,229 for a total of more than 1300 queries on four 
hundred topics.230  A banker who publicly supports the bill described 
the proposed rules as “unintelligible any way you read [them].”231  It 
seems that issues that caused conflict between the agencies were 
turned into queries rather than firm rules.  For example, one of the 
more contentious issues among the agencies is how actually to 
enforce the Volcker Rule.232  The FDIC proposed that chief 
executives be required to attest to compliance with the rule.233  The 
OCC objected to the rule and announced that CEO attestation would 
be a “deal-breaker.”234  Despite regular interagency working group 
meetings, the only compromise the agencies could come to on the 
issue by the publication deadline was to turn it into a query.235 
Given the broad powers delegated to the regulatory agencies by 
Congress, the substantive effect of the Act cannot be known until 
after the agencies promulgate rules and perhaps not even then.  The 
following Part suggests ideas for the agencies to consider when 
drafting the rules. 
V 
SUGGESTIONS TO CLOSE THE LOOPHOLES OF THE VOLCKER RULE 
Despite extensive delineations between permitted and prohibited 
activities in the Act, several areas remain that must be filled in by 
agency rules.  Most areas involve defining key terms and the scope of 
the permitted and limited activities.  Listed below are suggestions on 
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six issues agencies face as they write the rules within the parameters 
of the FSOC study. 
A.  Bank and Fund Reporting of Risk Exposure 
In addition to the explicit limitations on permitted proprietary 
trading and hedge fund investing, such as capital requirements, the 
amendment places additional general limitations on certain 
investments.  The Act prohibits even permitted trades and investments 
if the trades expose the banking entity to high risk.236  The Act directs 
agencies to define “high-risk assets or high-risk trading activities” by 
rule.237  Rather than laying out specific high-risk assets or trading 
activities, a nearly impossible task in the expansive and rapidly 
changing financial market, the agencies should require banks to 
disclose their level of risk, both overall and in individual investments. 
Reporting of risk exposure is important for two reasons.  First, 
acknowledging risk exposure can encourage the banking entity itself 
to increase risk-mitigating hedging activities or alter investment 
strategies to achieve more stable investments.  Second, appreciation 
of risk exposure and trends in individual financial institutions, and the 
financial system generally, will put oversight agencies in a better 
position to intervene more quickly and effectively in the face of 
impending institutional collapse than was possible in 2008. 
The idea of requiring hedge funds and banks to report their level of 
risk to the oversight committees is good in theory.  Unfortunately, it 
encounters logistical problems.  Banks and hedge funds themselves 
do not always know the level of risk to which their investments have 
exposed them.  This is apparent when one looks at what happened to 
Long-Term Capital Management.  Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), founded in 1994, was one of the most successful hedge 
funds (until it was not).  The fund managers believed, based on 
complex computer equations, that the long- and short-term net risk of 
their investments was small.238  They were wrong.  In 1998, LTCM’s 
investments soured and in order to prevent potential systemic 
meltdown, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a rescue 
package in which a consortium of fourteen private investment and 
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commercial banks injected $3.6 billion into the fund.239  In 1997, the 
year before the fund collapsed, two of LTCM’s board members 
shared the Nobel Prize in Economics for developing “a new method 
to determine the value of derivatives.”240  Oftentimes hedge fund 
managers and the world’s most brilliant economic minds are unable to 
appreciate the true risk of their investments. 
As recommended by the FSOC and the GAO, instead of requiring 
banks and hedge funds to report their risk exposure themselves, the 
regulatory agencies should require the banks and funds to disclose 
certain aspects of their investments and business ledgers, as 
qualitative metrics, particularly the leverage of their investments, so 
that the regulatory agencies may calculate the systemic risk from the 
information themselves.  This will limit the ability of the banks and 
funds to manipulate their numbers to report lower investment risk 
than they actually are exposed to and provide uniform and neutral 
guidelines for calculating risk based on raw data.  But even if banks 
accurately report their numbers and the agencies can calculate 
perceived risk from those reports, it is likely that risk, as 
demonstrated by the LTCM example, will still be significantly 
underappreciated, threatening the stability of the financial system.  In 
light of the complexity and uncertainty of risk exposure calculations, 
agencies must do more than oversee risk exposure in order to promote 
a stable financial system. 
Finally, as markets change quickly, banks should be required to 
report their risk exposure often.  Periodic risk assessment will give 
regulators a better opportunity to identify trouble sooner, making it 
easier to avert a potential financial disaster than if they receive risk 
assessments only rarely. 
B.  Defining “Hedge Fund” and “Venture Capital Fund” 
Defining “hedge fund” is challenging.  Much of hedge funds’ 
appeal, and much of their utility, lies in the fact that hedge funds are 
designed to avoid many of the regulations under the Investment 
Advisor’s Act, the Investment Company Act, the Securities Act, and 
the Securities Exchange Act.241  The amendment acknowledges this 
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aspect of hedge funds by defining them as “issuers that rely on the 
exclusion from the definition of investment company under . . . the 
Investment Company Act.”242  Under the exclusion from the 
Investment Act, hedge funds are defined as those funds that have 
outstanding, not publicly offered securities for fewer than one 
hundred investors, or are owned entirely by “qualified purchasers.”243  
But the Dodd-Frank Act allows agencies to bring other “similar 
funds” under the definition at their discretion.244 
Many hedge funds rely on these exceptions but so do many other 
funds and legal entities.245  Many who made recommendations during 
the public comment period following release of the FSOC study urged 
regulatory agencies to exclude venture capital funds from the 
definition of hedge and private equity funds because venture capital 
funds encourage innovation and their nature is fundamentally 
different than hedge and private equity funds.246  Venture capital 
funds are a subset of private equity funds that use their pooled capital 
to launch or expand small businesses. 
Under a directive from the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has proposed 
rules to distinguish venture capital funds from other forms of funds 
that are excluded from the Investment Company Act.247  The agencies 
should apply the SEC definitions to exclude venture capital funds 
from coverage under the Volcker Rule as well. 
Additionally, there are many hedge and private equity funds that do 
not rely on those exclusions, such as commodity pools.248  Agencies 
should use their authority granted by Congress to include “such 
similar funds” that do not rely on the Investment Company Act but 
that nonetheless pursue a hedge fund strategy under the definition of 
hedge fund.  Congress should look to the defining characteristics of 
hedge funds in order to bring those funds into the scope of “similar 
funds.”249 
These characteristics should look beyond the time period of return.  
Earlier this decade, the SEC unsuccessfully tried to increase 
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regulation over hedge funds by focusing on whether the fund 
provided a redemption option to clients within the first two years, 
which provides liquidity for the fund’s investors.250  While most 
hedge funds do focus on relatively short-term investments, the time 
period of return is not a defining characteristic and can easily be 
rearranged to avoid time-period-reliant definitions.251 
Instead, the agencies should focus on the defining characteristics of 
hedge and private equity funds—liquidity and leverage—when 
expanding the definition of those funds.  Liquidity of the fund’s 
investments is one attribute of hedge and private equity funds that 
distinguishes them from other types of funds.252 
Leverage is another defining characteristic of hedge funds, because 
most hedge funds use material leverage to increase the returns of their 
investments.253  For example, LTCM, discussed above, had invested 
five billion dollars of client money, but “had borrowed [an additional] 
$125 billion—a leverage factor of roughly thirty to one.”254  While 
leverage can increase returns on successful investments, making it 
appealing to investors, leverage also magnifies loss when investments 
are not successful.255 
By basing the definition of hedge funds on the liquidity and 
leverage of funds, the agencies would be focusing on the attributes 
that make those funds so risky in the first place, reinforcing the 
primary purpose behind the Volcker Rule256—to minimize risk in our 
financial system by reducing short-term, highly leveraged trading 
practices in banks. 
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C.  Defining “Customer” to Determine the Scope of Permitted 
Activities 
The amendment permits bank trading with hedge funds “only in 
connection with the provision of . . . services . . . to . . . customers.”257  
Agencies will need to define “customers” to ensure that this language 
is not used as a way around the prohibition on proprietary trading.  
There already are definitions of “customer” in both banking and 
securities laws, although the definitions differ.258 
Bank regulations define a “customer relationship” as a “continuing 
relationship” between the banking entity and the consumer in which 
the bank provides financial products to the customer that are to be 
used for “personal, family, or household purposes,” such as 
maintaining a deposit account with or receiving loans from the 
banking entity.259  Securities regulations, offer a more nuanced 
definition requiring a “substantive and pre-existing relationship.”260  
This means that the customer had a relationship with the bank before 
the terms of the sale were developed and offered to the customer, and 
the relationship involved knowledge by the bank of the customer’s 
sophistication and financial objectives.261  Securities law draws a 
sharp distinction between a “client” and a mere “customer” of the 
bank.262 
Because hedge fund pools often consist of contributions from 
wealthy and sophisticated investors, the definition of “customer” for 
Volcker Rule purposes should more closely mirror the definition used 
in security law.  The definition should require that the banks had a 
continuing relationship with the customer prior to the hedge fund 
investment, and that the existing relationship was substantial enough 
that the banking entity could develop knowledge of the customer’s 
financial situation, goals, and risk tolerance.  The definition should 
not depend on whether the relationship existed between the banking 
entity and the customer directly, or between the banking entity and 
the customer’s financial advisor, so long as the relationship allowed 
the bank to develop particularized knowledge of the customer’s 
financial situation and goals.  Finally, the customer relationship with 
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the hedge fund should be initiated by the customer or his agent rather 
than solicited by the banking entity. 
By structuring the definition of “customer” in this way, it will be 
easier for agencies to distinguish between trades initiated on the 
customer’s behalf rather than as a subterfuge for banks themselves to 
engage in prohibited proprietary trading.  Furthermore, such a 
definition will help reduce conflicts of interest between the banking 
entity and its customer’s investments because the customer, not the 
bank, will need to initiated the hedge fund relationship and investing. 
 
D.  Defining the Relationship Between Permitted “De Minimis 
Investments” and the Permitted Three-Percent Investment of Tier 1 
Capital 
The amendment permits banking entities to “make and retain” de 
minimis investments in hedge funds that are organized and offered by 
the banking entity itself.263  A de minimis investment is one that is so 
trifling264 that it will be “immaterial” to the banking entity, and 
therefore unable to pose a threat to the stability of the institution.  In 
addition to permitting only de minimis investments, the amendment 
caps the amount banking entities may invest in their own hedge funds 
at three percent of Tier 1 capital.265  An additional limitation on the 
de minimis investment is that the investment cannot account for more 
than three percent of each fund after a one-year start-up period during 
which the bank’s investment may account for up to one-hundred 
percent of the fund’s capital.266  The de minimis limit reduces the 
incentive for the bank to bail out the fund if it fails.267 
The agencies should treat the de minimis requirement and the 
“three percent of Tier 1 capital” requirement as two independent but 
interrelated limits on investing.  This would mean that banks for 
which an investment of three percent of Tier 1 capital could affect the 
security of the institution, making it more than a de minimis 
investment, would be prohibited from providing the three-percent 
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maximum allowed to the investment.  Conversely, banks for which a 
ten-percent investment of capital would have no significant effect on 
the stability of the institution, making a ten-percent investment of Tier 
1 capital a de minimis investment, would still be capped at a three-
percent investment of Tier 1 capital.  Essentially banks could invest 
up to three percent of Tier 1 capital in hedge funds, unless doing so 
would constitute more than a de minimis investment for that 
institution. 
The agencies should also define the three-percent limits as 
expansively as possible to include as much of the fund’s capital that is 
tied to the banking entity as possible.  For example, if bank 
employees invest in the fund, as permitted by the amendment with 
significant restrictions,268 those investments should count towards the 
three-percent cap on the bank’s investment in the fund. 
The rule requires that after the fund has been open to investors for 
one year, the banking entity’s investment in the fund cannot exceed 
more than three percent of the fund’s capital.269  Agencies should 
require an independent audit of the fund on the anniversary of its 
inception to ensure that the banking entity has met this requirement.  
But a one-time audit is insufficient to ensure that banks continue to 
comply with this mandate.  Instead, agencies should require periodic 
audits to ensure continued compliance with the three-percent limit. 
E.  Further Refining the Statutory Definition of “Banking Entity” 
Another key definition in the Volcker Rule is that of “banking 
entity.”  The statute defines “banking entity” as including any 
“affiliate or subsidiary” of an insured depository institution.270  
Including affiliates and subsidiaries under the definition of “banking 
entity” is important because without that inclusion, banking entities 
could simply rearrange their trading, placing the prohibited activities, 
like proprietary trading, into their affiliated companies.  However, the 
existing statutory definitions of “affiliate” and “subsidiary” could 
bring bank-offered hedge and private equity funds under the 
definition of “banking entity.”  Including hedge funds under the 
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definition of “banking entity” as an affiliate or subsidiary would 
create a catch-22 because banking entities and their affiliates are 
prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading or investing in hedge 
funds, but those activities are also explicitly permitted for hedge 
funds. 
Without correction, this definition could have several unintended 
consequences.  Companies (even nonfinancial companies) that are 
controlled by a bank-controlled hedge or private equity fund, and 
SEC-registered investment companies controlled by a banking entity 
would be subject to the Volcker Rule.271  The definition would also 
prohibit hedge funds that are controlled by a banking entity from 
investing in other funds and require each fund in a family of funds 
controlled by a banking entity to have a distinct name.272  Agencies 
must clarify that hedge funds and private equity funds are not 
considered affiliates or subsidiaries of banking entities so far as the 
applicability of hedge fund and proprietary trading guidelines are 
concerned in order to avoid results that Congress clearly did not 
intend. 
F.  Transparency and Director Accountability 
The Act requires that the chief executive officer of a banking entity 
must certify annually in writing that the bank complies with the 
requirement that they disclose to all hedge fund investors in writing 
that the banking entity does not insure the performance of investment 
funds.273  But the Act gives agencies broad discretion to impose 
additional limitations on bank involvement in hedge funds to ensure 
that fund losses are borne solely by the investors of the fund.274  
Directors of banking entities must be held accountable for ensuring 
that their banking entities have procedures in place to assure that they 
are compliant with the Volcker Rule and applicable regulations. 
The board of directors should actively monitor the risk exposure of 
their banking entity’s investments and have strategies in place for 
how to respond when a fund or investment exceeds the appropriate 
risk level.  The agencies should use their discretion to require that 
bank boards of directors submit response plans for how to divest 
funds when they exceed the de minimis or Tier 1 capital limitations. 
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One way of encouraging active participation and oversight of 
banking entities by their Boards of Directors is to require the banking 
entities to publicly publish information about the banking entity’s 
investments and risk exposure.275  Requiring public disclosure of 
aspects of the banking entity, such as the type and amount of 
investments, returns, and leveraging, essentially mandates that the 
board of directors must be actively involved in oversight.  Directors 
would no longer be able to protect themselves by claiming ignorance 
of the expansive investments of the entity that they oversee, and 
entities that deal with dangerously-invested or -leveraged companies 
will better be able to protect themselves.276  Disclosure will also 
allow regulatory agencies to see better the interconnectedness and 
weak points of the system, making them better able to intervene to 
prevent a domino collapse rather than only being able to react in the 
face of one. 
Furthermore, by publishing this information publicly, consumers 
will be able to protect themselves and make informed decisions about 
which companies they should bank with and where they should invest 
their money.  Honest public disclosure of these facts will also 
encourage responsible investment strategies by opening investment 
strategies to public scrutiny.  Banks fear that they will lose a 
competitive edge by either disclosing investment strategies or causing 
reputational harm.277  The agencies should take care to ensure that the 
information they require to be disclosed publicly will be general 
enough not to affect proprietary secrets, but specific enough to allow 
the public and regulatory agencies to appreciate the risk or safety of 
the banks’ investment strategies.  Agencies should be less concerned 
about releasing information that could cause reputational harm to the 
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revelation of AIG’s exposure.  Two days before Lehman collapsed, when asked if he had 
been watching AIG, Paulson replied: “Why, what’s wrong with AIG?”  Paulson had 
mistakenly believed that the New York State Insurance Commission was monitoring 
AIG’s risk exposure and liquidity.  Id. 
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entities because the threat of reputational harm to banks is likely to 
encourage them to invest safely and responsibly.278  Opening up the 
risk and investment strategies to public scrutiny will shift competition 
away from the riskiest investments with the chance to reap the highest 
returns toward secure investments that are properly hedged.  The 
information disclosed, either publicly or only to the oversight 
agencies, must also be comprehensive enough that the agencies will 
be able to determine if the banks are creatively skirting the Volcker 
Rule’s prohibitions on proprietary trading. 
Due to the likely length and complexity of the disclosures, it is 
unlikely that most investors will properly be able to analyze the 
disclosed information and to form informed opinions about their 
investment strategies.279  The primary value served by public 
disclosure is the perceived threat of reputational harm by disclosing 
unsafe investment practices, as well as the fact that public disclosure 
will require boards of directors to be more involved in the oversight 
of the company’s investments. 
CONCLUSION 
President Obama has been echoing themes extolled by one if his 
predecessors nearly eighty years ago.  In his first inaugural address, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that “we require two 
safeguards against a return of the evils of the old order; there must be 
a strict supervision of all banking and credits and investments; there 
must be an end to speculation with other people’s money.”280  The 
Dodd-Frank Act was an attempt to re-strengthen those safeguards in a 
way that seems to have been forgotten in the intervening decades.  
However, that Act, while declaring a policy of more oversight to 
encourage prudent banking practices, appears to have delegated too 
many details to the regulatory agencies to be able to fully realize the 
edicts promoted in the Act. 
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Political Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule 
Congress should have foreseen that providing a general directive to 
regulatory agencies to define proprietary trading and classify trades 
would be too great of a task for the agencies.  In 2005, regulators 
attempted to define proprietary trading in order to better oversee the 
activity, but were ultimately unable to craft an adequate definition, 
concluding that preventing proprietary trading would require a 
“subjective, case-by-case evaluation.”281  Some senators recognized 
the risks of such extensive delegation; Senator Richard Shelby (R-
Ala.), the only Republican to support an earlier, stricter incarnation of 
the Volcker Rule, stated through a spokesperson that the proposed 
regulations are “filled with central questions that Congress should 
have answered before even drafting Dodd-Frank.”282 
Despite the Volcker Rule’s extensive delineations between 
permitted and prohibited activities, there remain several areas that 
must be filled in by agency rules.  Most involve defining the scope of 
the permitted and limited activities.  The devil, of course, is in the 
details, which Congress left to the agencies.  From the fight and 
compromises in Congress as well as the studies and proposed rules 
the agencies released, it is clear that filling in the details is a 
gargantuan task.  The more central the agency rules are to the final 
form of a law, the greater the opportunity for agency capture.  But 
could the Dodd-Frank Act go further and exceed the capabilities of 
our regulatory system?  Watching the agencies struggle not only to 
meet the rulemaking deadlines but also to formulate any concrete 
rules or definitions at all, it is difficult not to wonder whether 
Congress’s delegation to the agencies simply asked too much of them, 
leaving our financial system unregulated and at risk of another, 
possibly more severe recession. 
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